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Abstract
Strategic interactions between countries, such as arms races, alliances and
wider economic and political shocks, can induce strong cross-sectional depen-
dence in models of military expenditures using panel data. If the assumption
of cross-sectional independence fails, standard panel estimators such as fixed
or random effects can lead to misleading inference. This paper shows how to
improve estimation of dynamic, heterogenous, panel models of the demand
for military expenditure allowing for cross-sectional dependence in errors us-
ing two approaches: Principal Components and Common Correlated Effect
estimators. Our results show that it is crucial to allow for cross-section de-
pendence and there are large gains in fit by allowing for both dynamics and
between country heterogeneity in demand models of military expenditures.
Our estimates show that mean group estimation of error correction models
using the Common Correlated Effect approach provides an effective modelling
framework.
JEL Category: C33, C82, H56
Keywords, Military Expenditures, Panel Data, Factor models.
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1 Introduction
Models of military expenditures have to deal with strategic interactions between
countries that induce cross-section dependence in panel data. These can arise for
a variety of reasons: arms races between hostile countries; burden sharing within
alliances; security-web interactions within regional networks; and economic and po-
litical shocks, like terrorist attacks, affecting the general perception of threat for all
units. These strategic interactions generate unobserved common factors in empiri-
cal models of military expenditures which make the errors correlated across cross-
sectional units. If the unobserved strategic factors that cause the cross-sectional
dependence are correlated with regressors of interest, such as income, then the esti-
mated coefficients of those regressors will be biased and inconsistent.
While the importance of cross-section dependence has been widely recognised
in empirical arms race and alliance models, the issue has usually been addressed
in the context of quite restrictive models. For instance, Dunne et al. (2008) rely
on qualitative judgements about a country’s security-web to allow the military ex-
penditures of a country’s neighbours to be aggregated. This approach relies on
identifying allies and enemies and deciding ad-hoc weights in the aggregation pro-
cedure. An alternative approach, recently adopted in the panel literature, assumes
that the cross-sectional dependence can be characterised by a finite number of un-
observed common factors affecting all units with different intensities. This approach
can be implemented empirically if there exist proxies for the common factors. One
way to obtain proxies is by extracting cross-sectional commonalities in military ex-
penditures using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA estimates the linear
combinations of military expenditures and factor loadings that account for most of
the variation in the data. A number of these linear combinations can be included
in a demand model to control for cross-sectional dependence and estimation can be
achieved using standard least squares or maximum likelihood estimation. A second
way to obtain proxies, known as Common Correlated Effect (Pesaran, 2006), con-
sists of approximating the unobserved common factor using cross-section averages
of the dependent and independent variables. One advantage of this approach is that
is easily implementable, it yields consistent estimates under a variety of conditions
– e.g. serial correlation in errors, contemporaneous correlation between regressors
and unobserved factors, spatial and temporal correlations as shown by Coakley et al.
(2006); Kapetanios et al. (2011); Pesaran and Tosetti (2011)– and the estimates have
easy interpretation.
These approaches require panel data with large N and large T. SIPRI provides
the most reliable and widely used series of military expenditures data in academic
research on defence economics, but until recently had the disadvantage that it started
in 1988. The new release of SIPRI military expenditure data since 1945 enables the
application of large T panel techniques and the implementation of factor models
that allow for cross-sectional dependence in errors.
In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of the demand for military expen-
diture where there is error cross-sectional dependence due to unobserved common
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factors generated by strategic interactions. This analysis develops the approach used
in Cavatorta (2010) for the MENA region and builds on recent panel time-series pro-
cedures surveyed by Chudik and Pesaran (2015b) and given a text-book treatment
in Pesaran (2015).
We show how to improve estimation of dynamic models of military expendi-
tures with cross-sectional dependence in errors using Principal Components (PCs)
and Common Correlated Effect (CCE) estimation procedures and compare the es-
timates with standard estimation techniques which ignore the issue. Unlike the
standard fixed effect approach, we allow for heterogeneity between countries, both
in regression coefficients and in the impact of the unobserved strategic factors. We
also examine differences between the Cold War period and the post-Cold War pe-
riod and between different regions. Our results show that it is crucial to allow for
cross-section dependence, doing so, whether by PCs or CCE methods, substantially
improves the fit. The results also show that it is crucial to allow for both dynamics
and between country heterogeneity, both of which also substantially improve the fit.
The gain in fit in the dynamic model from allowing for a structural break at the end
of the Cold War is less substantial.
This paper makes two distinct contributions to the existing literature in de-
fence economics. Firstly, it provides a pedagogical guide for empirical researchers
interested in estimating dynamic, heterogeneous, panel models of the demand for
military expenditure allowing for cross section dependence induced by unobserved
common factors. This dependence is likely to be an issue at different levels of analy-
sis: changes in military expenditures can be the result of global strategic interactions
and world-wide economic or technological shocks as well as regional threat level and
economic changes. Secondly, the paper suggests that it is important for researchers
using the extended SIPRI dataset to take account of dynamics, heterogeneity and
cross-section dependence when choosing their specification. In particular, mean
group estimation of error correction models augmented by cross-section averages
seems to provide an effective modelling framework.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the data issues and provides
summary statistics. Section 3 sets out the basic theoretical framework of factor
models. Section 4 uses the PCs and CCE procedures to estimate static factor
models that attempt to determine the relative influence of economic and strategic
factors on the shares of military expenditure. Section 4.1 provides estimates of the
principal components to provide an indication of the number of common factors
driving relative investments in military expenditure at the level of the world and
the individual regions and Section 4.2 discusses the results. Section 5 allows for
dynamics both in PCs and CCE models. Section 6 provides some conclusions and
suggestions for further research.
3
2 Data Issues
The SIPRI military expenditure data are the most widely used series in academic
research on military expenditures. They have the disadvantage that, up to now,
SIPRI has only provided consistent data from 1988. This is quite a short post
Cold War sample and researchers have tried to extend the data either by splicing to
earlier, unapproved, SIPRI series or to Correlates of War, COW, series, neither of
which are quite consistent with the later SIPRI authorised series. Brauner (2015)
discusses the combination of SIPRI and COW series. The availability of a database
with a longer alpha-test version of the authorised SIPRI series thus enables some
more interesting explorations of the data.
SIPRI provides three series. Dit a domestic measure of military expenditure in
local currency at current prices; Mit real military expenditure in constant US prices
and exchange rates of a base year; and the share (or military burden) Sit = Mit/Yit
military expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, GDP. The GDP
series that SIPRI use to construct the share, Yit, is also available in the database.
There are two ways that one could convert Dit into Mit. Set t = b for the base
year and use Pit for the domestic price index and P
∗
t for the US price index and Eit
for the countries exchange rate against the US dollar, with Eib being the value in
the base year. Then the constant price and exchange rate series is
Mit =
Dit
PitEib
.
This is the procedure that SIPRI uses and it has the advantage that Mit maintains
the time-series properties of Dit/Pit real military expenditure in the country, since it
is only scaled by a constant the base year exchange rate. However changes in the base
year can cause large apparent movements in the estimate of military expenditure in
constant dollars for a particular year given the volatility of exchange rates.
An alternative procedure would convert the domestic military expenditure into
US dollars for each year and deflate by a US price index to give
M˜it =
Dit
EitP ∗it
= Mit/Rit.
These two will be equivalent only if the real exchange rate
Rit =
EitP
∗
it
EibPit
= 1,
is equal to unity, that is if purchasing power parity held.
The focus of discussions of data quality is usually on the problems of measure-
ment of military expenditure and in their discussion of sources and methods SIPRI
comment on the limitations of the data in terms of reliability, validity and com-
parability. However, it should be recognised that there are substantial revisions in
measured GDP, price indexes and in purchasing power parity exchange rates as well.
Thus these are also sources of measurement error and data revisions.
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We chose to use a balanced panel which gave a large T for a large set of N + 1
countries. The 50 year period 1965-2014 with some interpolation, gave a sample of
70 countries (or 72 for some calculations).
We give summary statistics, for military expenditure, GDP and the share of
military expenditure for the full sample and for the balanced panel in Table 1.
In terms of the share of military expenditure the full and balanced samples were
very similar: means of 2.96% in the full sample and 2.89% in the balanced sample.
The full sample, with a standard deviation of 3.5%, was more dispersed than the
balanced sample, with a standard deviation of 2.9. In the balanced sample 80% of the
variance came from the between-country cross-section dimension. Both distributions
are highly skewed. While there is a minimum of zero to the left, there is no maximum
to the right, military expenditure can be over 100% of GDP. The maximum in the
full sample was 117% in the balanced sample 30%. The distributions of military
expenditure and GDP are also skewed. Military expenditure in the full sample, is
about 60% of the balanced sample. However, GDP in the full sample is twice that
of the balanced sample. Notice that the mean of the ratios of military expenditure
to GDP is not the same as the ratio of the means.
The bottom panel of Table 1 gives summary statistics for the shares of military
expenditure for the five regions. Four of the regions, Africa, Americas, Asia, and
Europe, have very similar mean shares of military expenditure between 2-3%, the
Middle East is much higher at 8.7%.
3 Modelling Framework
3.1 Strategic Interactions
The model we use to provide a framework is very standard in the literature and
is reviewed in Dunne and Smith (2007). It assumes that military expenditures
are determined by both economic and strategic factors. The economic factors are
typically measured by GDP to approximate the budget constraint and the strategic
factors are usually measured by the military expenditures of other countries, allies or
potential enemies, which represent the threat or fear factor. Starting from a simple
static logarithmic model determining mit the logarithm of real military expenditures
of country i = 0, 1, 2, ..., N in year t = 1, 2, ..., N , by the logarithm of their real GDP,
yit, and other countries military expenditures, mjt, for j 6= i, then the model can be
written as a system of N + 1 equations of the form:
mit = αi + ηiyit +
∑
j 6=i
γijmjt + uit. (1)
The income elasticity of demand for military expenditure is ηi the feedback from
other countries military expenditures is given by γij. Smith (1995) discusses how
equations of this sort can be derived from optimising a social welfare function,
which depends on security and consumption, subject to a budget constraint. Other
variables could be added such as indicators of political regime as in Brauner (2015);
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indicators of internal or external conflict as in Dunne et al. (2008) or other sources of
income, such as aid, as in Collier and Hoeﬄer (2007). But given our focus is on cross-
section dependence we will just use a simple model relating military expenditures
to GDP.
Clearly it is not possible to freely estimate the N feedback coefficients.1 Various
ways to deal with this curse of dimensionality have been adopted in the military
literature. It is common to focus on just a few countries, where one can estimate
action-reaction models of the Richardson arms-race type. But even in classic arms
races, like Greece and Turkey or India and Pakistan, the actors are responding to
other threats than from their antagonist; the Soviet Union in the case of Greece and
Turkey and China in the case of India and Pakistan, and the expenditures of possible
allies would also matter. One might expect that for enemies γij > 0, reflecting arms
races; for allies γij < 0, since their military expenditures that can substitute for
yours; and for uninvolved pairs γij = 0. In the literature on alliances, surveyed
in Murdoch (1995), considerable attention is paid to how the military expenditures
of allies should be aggregated. The technology may be that strength depends on
the simple sum, the best shot or the weakest link. Another common procedure to
reduce this curse of dimensionality is to use ad-hoc weights to sum the military
expenditures of potential allies to give a measure of friends spending and sum that
of potential adversaries to give a measure of foes spending. These ad-hoc weights
can be based on qualitative judgements about the security web, the nature of the
linkages with the other countries, as in Dunne et al. (2008).
3.2 Principal Component Approach
If a set of allies are all responding to a common threat, they are likely to all move
their military expenditures together generating a positive correlation between them
as well as between them and their potential enemies. Such positive correlations
between allies are common in the literature. This positive correlation among all
the military expenditures of a group of interacting nations can be represented by a
common unobserved threat factor driving the military expenditures of the interact-
ing countries. Among a large group of countries, there are likely to be more than
one strategic interaction, so the military expenditures may be driven by more than
one threat factor. Assume that there are K such interactions and with K such
unobserved latent factors, f ∗kt, k = 1, 2, .., K . Then we can write the model as
mit = αi + ηiyit +
K∑
k=1
λikf
∗
kt + eit (2)
Where the λik are non-zero if country i is involved in interaction k. The fkt can be
estimated by the method of principal components, PCs, as linear combinations of
1If the dependence was on own and others lagged military expenditure, (1) would correspond
to the infinite VAR discussed by Chudik and Pesaran (2011).
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the military expenditures:
f ∗kt =
N∑
j=1
akjmjt k = 1, 2, .., K (3)
and one might hope that a few PCs would account for a lot of the variation in military
expenditures. One would expect K to be much smaller than N , so estimating (2)
will be much easier than estimating (1) . One can recover the coefficients on other
countries military expenditure as
γij = λikakj.
If we define the logarithm of the share of military expenditure in GDP as sit =
mit − yit then we can write the model in log shares as
sit = αi + βiyit +
K∑
k=1
λikfkt + eit (4)
where βi = ηi − 1. If the income elasticity of demand for military expenditures is
unity, as is often assumed, βi = 0 and log GDP drops out of the equations. Shares
may also be a better indicator of threat perceptions than military expenditures, not
being dominated by size, so one could estimate the factors as the PCs of the shares
of military expenditure:
fkt =
N∑
i=1
akisit k = 1, 2, .., K. (5)
Estimating the factors using (5) rather than (3) implies that the threat from
enemies or support from allies is represented not by the level of their military ex-
penditures but by their share of military expenditure in output, perhaps as an
indication of commitment or intent. This is not implausible given the importance
attached by NATO to the commitment made at the 2014 Cardiff summit to spend
at least 2% of GDP on defence. The shares model can be compared with the levels
model using some model selection criterion like the BIC,2 which can be used even
though the models are not nested. To nest model (4) in model (2) , one would need
to add the log GDP of the other countries to (2).
The strategic factors may not be global but regional so the model could be
applied not over all countries N, but over the number of countries in the region
Nr, for r = 1, 2, ...R. One could also allow for the US being a dominant unit, as
discussed in Chudik and Pesaran (2013) that appears as an explanatory variable
in every region. The Principal Components allow us to measure how much of the
variance of the shares or military expenditure is accounted for by these strategic
factors and how they influence each country.
2The BIC seems more appropriate than the AIC because it is more parsimonious and with large
data sets it is easy for parameters to proliferate.
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Model (4) is heterogeneous, the coefficients differ across countries and we can
report the mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995) reporting the average
and standard error of the coefficients. A special case of model (4) is the two way
fixed effect model, which imposes slope homogeneity, βi = β, and the factors having
the same effect on each country
∑K
k=1 λikfkt = αt. The model is then:
sit = αi + αt + βyit + eit. (6)
A model which is intermediate between the mean group and two way fixed effects is
the interactive fixed effects model of Bai (2009), which assumes slope homogeneity
but allows the effect of the factors to differ over countries.
Model (4) is a very parsimonious model. Clearly, there are many other variables
that one might think are omitted from the model. These might include measures
of conflict and of the institutions in the country, and many other economic and
political variables. Using a parsimonious model has the advantage that we can use
the maximum number of observations for which we have SIPRI share data, not
losing data because of missing observations on other variables. It also allows us to
focus on the role of cross-section dependence in a simple case. Denote these omitted
variables by the vector zit, so that the correct model is
sit = α
∗
i + β
∗
i yit +
K∑
k=1
λ∗ikfkt + φ
′
izit + eit.
Notice that β∗i is measuring a different parameter of interest, from βi. The parameter
β∗i measures the effect of a change in income holding zit constant, while βi measures
the effect of a change in income allowing zit to adjust as it does in the sample. The
effect of this omission depends on the correlation between income, the global factors,
fkt, and the country specific omitted variables zit. Consider the case of democracy.
It seems a relevant variables since democracies spend less than autocracies on the
military and are richer. If the country is a democracy throughout the period, zit = zi,
it does not vary over time. The effect of any time invariant variable is picked
up by the intercept αi. After the Cold War many country undertook a process of
democratisation. This time-varying factor will be correlated across countries and
hence with the global factors, which pick up the reduction in the share of military
expenditure. To the extent that the country specific variables are correlated with
GDP and the factors, these variables will pick up the effects of the zit and may be
a parsimonious representation of many influences that are correlated with income
or across countries.3 To the extent to which the country specific variables vary over
time in a way that is uncorrelated with income or the factors, this will increase the
unexplained variance. How big an improvement in fit results from including these
possible omitted variables is a subject for future research.
3Pesaran and Smith (2014) make a similar argument.
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3.3 Common Correlated Effect Approach
Above we assumed that the unobserved factors were estimated by principal compo-
nents, but they can also be allowed for using the correlated common effect, CCE,
estimator. Reparameterise (2) in terms of shares, so βi = ηi − 1, and for exposition
initially assume that there is only a single threat factor, though in estimation we
allow for a multi-factor model (e.g. there there may be separate factors for enemies
and allies). Then
sit = αi + βiyit + λift + eit. (7)
Average (7) over the countries to give
st = α + βyt + λft + et + ηt (8)
where
st =
∑N
i=1 sit/N, λ =
∑N
i=1 λi/N, et =
∑N
i=1 eit/N,
β =
∑N
i=1 βi/N, yt =
∑N
i=1 yit/N, ηt =
∑N
i=1
(
βi − β
)
yit/N.
Assuming λ 6= 0, we can write (8) as
ft = λ
−1 (
st − α− βyt − et − ηt
)
thus we can approximately filter out the effect of the factor by including st and yt
in (7) instead of the factor
sit = αi + βiyit + λi
[
λ
−1 (
st − α− βyt − et − ηt
)]
+ eit
sit = ai + βiyit + δ1ist + δ2iyt + uit (9)
where
uit = λiλ
−1
(−et − ηt) + eit,
ai = αi − λiλ−1α.
Pesaran (2006) provides more details and the generalisation to the dynamic
case, which we use below, is provided in Chudik and Pesaran (2015a). Note that
the covariance of st with uit declines with N, so for N large we can treat st as
exogenous.
We can compare (7) , using two factors, estimating the ft by the principal com-
ponents of the shares, with (9) and see which fits better. If we use two PCs both
the CCE and PC equations will have the same degrees of freedom. In this case,
we can just sum the Log-likelihoods over the N countries, treating the equations
as independent, which seems reasonable given that we will have accounted for any
strong factors.
Both (7) and (9) assume heterogeneous relationships, different for every country.
We could also see whether there is any evidence of homogeneity by comparing the
BIC of the heterogeneous models with the BIC of the two way fixed effect model
(6) , above which imposes slope homogeneity βi = β and that the factor has the
same effect everywhere so λift = λft = αt.
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4 Estimation of Static Factor Models
4.1 Estimation of the Common Factors (PCA)
The PCs were estimated from the shares of military expenditure and from the log-
arithms of military expenditures, the logarithms of GDP and the logarithms of the
shares for the 70 countries in our balanced panel over the whole period, 1965-2014;
for the two sub-periods 1965-88 and 1989-2014; and for the five regions. The cu-
mulative share of the variance of military burden explained by the first 5 Principal
Components is given in Table 2 for each case.
For all 72 countries and the whole period, the first PC explains 50% of the
variance of the share, the second 17% and the third 7%, so the first three explain
74% of the variance and the first 5, 82%. Clearly, there are strong common factors
that drive these 72 series. In the Cold War the first PC explains less of the variation
than in the post Cold War periods, though the total explained by the first 5 is
similar. The strength of the common factors differ across regions. For Africa and
the Americas, the first PC explains a much smaller part of the variance than it does
in the other regions and the second a larger part relative to the other regions. The
first PC explains 37% in Africa and 43% in the Americas, compared to 60% or more
in the other regions. It seems plausible that more idiosyncratic factors drive the
shares of military expenditures in Africa and the Americas. Notice that the shares
are not weighted, so in the measured variance of the shares in the Americas, the
US gets equal weight to any other country. Because of this, including the US in
the other regions did not change the results very much, since it has a small weight.
In Asia, Europe and the Middle East the first PC explains a larger proportion of
the variance than in the full sample, in Europe a striking 79% of the variance is
explained by the first PC. Europe was in the front line of the Cold War and it is
plausible that European shares of military expenditure were driven largely by the
Cold War factor.
For all 72 countries and the whole period, the first PC is plotted against the
second PC in Figure 1. The bulk of the observations lie in a vertical column, with a
value for PC1 of just over 0.1. This roughly corresponds to the mean share, giving an
an equal positive weight to most countries. There are a group of countries that have
negative values for PC1, these are Algeria, Burundi, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador,
Japan, Liberia, Sierra, Leone, Sri Lanka. LYA, Mexico and Uganda have very small
positive values. All these countries except Japan and, perhaps, Mexico have seen
substantial civil wars. It is interesting that this PCA procedure does identify these
as outliers even though it was not designed to do so. There is also a pattern for
countries in the main group with a high or low value for PC2, to have a value of
PC1 closer to zero, introducing some curvature.
When one looks at it by sub-period, the post-Cold War period figure looks very
similar to Figure 1, with most countries having a positive weighting. However, for
the Cold War period the pattern is very different. Figure 2 shows a large block of
countries having a positive weighting, and a large block having a negative weighting.
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The curvature apparent in Figure 1 is now apparent in both blocks. It looks almost
like a circle.
Figure 3 plots PC1 and PC2. PC1 is roughly constant till about 1985 and then
trends steadily downwards. It reflects the high shares of the cold war, then the
downward trend. PC2 trends upwards to the early 1980s then trends downwards.
It is not so clear what the interpretation of PC2 is. This is a limitation of PCs, it
is often difficult to interpet them.
Table 3 gives the proportion explained by the first five PCs for the log share, the
log of military spending and the log of GDP. The proportions explained were higher
for the log of share than share, the first PC explaining 55% of log share as compared
to 50% of share. Not surprisingly the common factors in log military expenditure
and log GDP are much higher than for log shares because the level variables have
more variance, and log GDP has a strong trend. For log GDP the first PC explains
95% of the variance.
4.2 CCE and PC static model estimates
We report the Pesaran and Smith (1995) mean group estimates for these models.
Estimates are given for the full sample, two sub-periods 1965-88 and 1989-2014 and
for the five regional groupings. The tables give the Wald test for the hypothesis
that the means of the three slope coefficients are zero. It is a test on the averages
of the coefficients. The LL is the sum of the maximised log likelihood over the N
countries thus reflects the fit of the individual regressions not the means.
The mean group estimates using PCs MG-PC are given in Table 4, together
with the estimates with no factors in the bottom panel. Adding the factors clearly
improves the fit and changes the estimate of the coefficient of GDP. There is clear
evidence of a structural break. Splitting the data into two sub-periods improves the
fit substantially, increasing the log-likelihood for the model including PCs from 1980
to 3301. The pattern of coefficients is quite different in the whole period, where log
GDP is insignificant and the two factors significant, and the two sub-periods, where
GDP is significant and, with the exception of the first factor in the pre-Cold War
period, the factors are not significant on average. Notice that while the average
of the coefficients of the factors may not be significant, they may be significant in
individual countries: some responding positively and some negatively to the factors.
Although the coefficients of GDP are significant in the sub-periods they are not
large, indicating that the common assumption that the income elasticity of demand
for military expenditure is close to one, is not unreasonable. Disaggregation by
regions has a much smaller effect, raising the LL from 1980 to 2138. In the regions,
the first factor is significant and positive, but the second factor is insignificant.
The mean group estimates using cross-section means MG-CCE are given in Table
5. As with the PC estimates, splitting the sample into sub-periods improves the fit
substantially increasing LL from 1757 to 3023. It is also clear that including two
PCs works better than including the means of the share and log GDP. As in the PC
case, the coefficient of log GDP is insignificant in the whole period but significant
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in the two sub-periods. Whereas the pattern of GDP only being significant when
the sample is split into two sub-periods is the same in the PC and CCE cases, the
size of the coefficient are not. The CCE estimates suggest that military expenditure
is very inelastic, with an elasticity of 0.49 in the first period compared with the
PC estimate of 0.79. In the second period the difference is smaller, with the CCE
estimate of 0.77 and the PC of 0.86. The fact that the coefficient of GDP is larger in
the CCE estimator suggests that it is a countries GDP relative to the world average
that matters. In all cases the mean of the coefficients of log GDP, β¯ = N−1
∑
βi
is of opposite sign to the mean of the coefficients of GDP average, δ¯2 = N
−1∑ δ1i.
In the two sub-periods when β¯, the coefficient of log GDP, is significant that on
average GDP, δ¯2, is also significant. The PC estimate based on the shares cannot
capture this relative feature whereas the CCE estimator does.
It is also noticeable that in almost all the cases the mean of the coefficients of the
mean share, δ¯1 = N
−1∑ δ1i from (9) is close to one and is very significant. In the
two way fixed effect estimator the coefficient of the mean of the dependent variable,
δ1, would be one and the coefficient on the mean of the independent variable, δ2
would be equal and opposite the coefficient of the independent variable, since (6)
can be written as
sit − s¯t = αi + β(yit − y¯t) + εit.
Figure 4 plots the histogram of the coefficients of income for both procedures,
PCA and CCE. The CCE estimates seem more dispersed, though in both cases the
range is quite wide (income elasticities between -0.5 and almost 2: there is clearly
considerable heterogeneity in the income coefficients. Figure 5 plots the scatter
diagram between the two sets of income coefficients. There is a positive though not
very strong relationship, the fitted regression line being dominated by an outlier,
where both estimates are close to -1.5. The average income coefficients differ between
the two methods, primarily because of the high variance of the CCE estimates.
5 Dynamic Factor Models
5.1 PCs and CCE dynamic models
Dynamics can be important in models of military expenditures, since the variables
may be I(1) and possibly cointegrated.4 Below, for exposition, we present the equa-
tions using the CCE estimator is used, but the equations for the PC estimator have
the same form.5
4Breitung and Pesaran (2008) discuss unit roots and cointegration in panels. Kapetanios et al.
(2011) discuss panels with non-stationary multifactor error structures.
5The model was also estimated allowing for the possibility that the US is a dominant unit,
following Chudik and Pesaran (2013). To do this, the change and lagged level of the US military
shares was added to the error correction model. However, they added relatively little to the fit, so
the results are not reported.
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The dynamic CCE equation is:
sit = α0i + α1isi,t−1 + β0iyit + β1iyi,t−1 + δ10,ist + δ11,ist−1 (10)
+δ20,iyt + δ21,iyt−1 + uit.
This can also be written in error correction form
∆sit = a0i + a1isi,t−1 + b0i∆yit + b1iyi,t−1 + d10,i∆st + d11,ist−1 (11)
+d20,i∆yt + d21,iyt−1 + uit.
The error correction form is useful to capture both long and short-term dynamics
in a single model. The dynamic PCs model specifications are similar, substituting
∆f¯1 for ∆st and f¯1 for st−1 and ∆f¯2 for ∆yt and f¯2 for yt−1. The number of
estimated parameters remains the same, so the models are directly comparable using
log-likelihoods.
5.2 PCs and CCE dynamic estimates
The mean-group estimates of the dynamic model (11) are reported in Table 6. Con-
trolling for cross-sectional dependence substantially improves the fit of the models:
the log-likelihoods from CCE models (columns 1 to 3) and PCs models (columns 4
to 6) increase significantly from those of models ignoring cross-sectional dependence.
Based on the log-likelihood, the model using PCs (column 4) performs slightly better
than the model using CCE (column 1). However, the magnitude of the factors’ coef-
ficients are difficult to interpret as they do not have clear-cut units of measurement.
This makes the interpretation of long-run effects of the general common threat level
difficult.
In the CCE models, the mean group estimate of the long-run effect of a common
increase in the level of threat, represented by the global average share of military
expenditure, is easily calculated by
∑−(d11,i/a1i)/N . In this case, the two coeffi-
cients have the same units, in PCs models the two coefficients have different units.
We show the heterogeneity of long-run effects of military expenditures to common
threat estimated using CCE in Figure 6. The distribution of long-run effects using
PCs model is almost uniformly centered at zero because the estimated coefficient
of the first factor, d11, is almost zero in any country. The US is an extreme outlier
because the coefficient a1i is almost zero making the ratio very large. The heteroge-
neous estimator, on which the mean-group estimates are based, also perform much
better than the fixed effect, FE, estimator which imposes homogeneity. Thus we
do not report the FE results. The coefficient on s¯t−1 in the FE model (0.0965)
and that of the mean-group estimator (0.206) are different, suggesting that country
heterogeneity is important.
Splitting the CCE model by pre- and post-1988 period does not improve the fit
as measured by the BIC. This is because there is a trade-off between fit and number
of estimated parameters. The time-series by period are too short and the increase in
estimated parameters imposes a large penalty on the fit. Interestingly, the long-run
13
effects of a common increase in the level of threat pre- and post-1988 are different
and there is a modest heterogeneity. This suggests that using a simple Cold War
dummy variable for pre- and post-1988 is not sufficient to capture that variation. In
addition, there is little correlation between the estimated coefficient on yt−1 in the
Cold War and post-Cold War period (these correlations are -0.09 and 0.03 using the
CCE and PCs models, respectively.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we consider a model of the demand for military expenditure where
there is cross-sectional dependence in the errors due to unobserved common factors
generated by strategic interactions. If such omitted factors are correlated with the
regressors, as they well may be, they will cause the coefficients of those regressors
to be biased. Using either cross-section means or principal components to proxy the
factors we find that allowing for cross-section dependence significantly improves the
fit and changes the values of the coefficients. Clearly there are strong strategic fac-
tors driving the shares of military expenditure, so it is important that one allow for
these factors. There is also evidence of substantial heterogeneity across countries,
so that assuming slope homogeneity as is done in fixed effect models may be mis-
leading. The procedures to allow for cross-section dependence, which we describe
in detail, are relatively straightforward to implement: add cross-section means or
principal components.
There are a range of natural extensions. Firstly, to emphasise the role of cross-
section dependence and to obtain the largest possible sample, we have used a very
simple model with income as the only independent variable. There are many other
economic and political measures that have been used to explain military expen-
ditures in the literature and their role could be investigated. Secondly, we have
assumed that income is exogenous despite the fact that there is a large literature
investigating the effect of military expenditure on growth. This issue could be in-
vestigated by estimating a VAR in military expenditures and GDP and testing for
the pattern of Granger causality. Thirdly, our results show that there is consider-
able heterogeneity and there is scope to examine the factors that determine that
heterogeneity: are there characteristics of the countries that explain the differences
in coefficients? This could be linked to case studies of the individual countries. The
extended SIPRI data set opens up the possibility of a large range of quantitative
and qualitative studies.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
N group Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Entire panel (1965-2014)
burden 172 6,420 0.029608 0.035163 0 1.173498
milex (billion) 172 6,372 9.108008 45.84714 0 720.2188
GDP (billion) 172 8,600 32652.5 511791.7 0 2.72E+07
Balanced panel
burden 70 3,500 0.028917 0.029275 0.001399 0.304638
milex (billion) 70 3,412 14.75106 60.63815 0.001655 720.2188
GDP (billion) 70 3,500 15802.79 92983.97 1.55E-11 150286
Military burden by region
Africa 19 950 0.023637 0.022778 0.001399 0.267347
Americas 16 800 0.020704 0.013485 0.003482 0.090634
Asia 11 550 0.027417 0.015566 0.005447 0.069917
Europe 17 850 0.022885 0.011169 0.004746 0.059623
Middle East 6 300 0.087121 0.057432 0.015873 0.304638
Table 2: Cumulative Proportions of Military Burden explained by Principal Com-
ponents
All Cold War period Post-Cold War Africa Americas Asia Europe Mid East
N 72 72 72 20 16 11 17 7
T 65-14 65-88 89-14 65-14 65-14 65-14 65-14 65-14
PC1 0.4982 0.4195 0.5711 0.374 0.4293 0.6654 0.7929 0.5961
PC2 0.672 0.5976 0.7068 0.6008 0.6414 0.783 0.8827 0.8021
PC3 0.7397 0.7323 0.7993 0.6854 0.7479 0.8475 0.9389 0.8963
PC4 0.7899 0.7928 0.8432 0.7531 0.8134 0.8974 0.9569 0.9518
PC5 0.8241 0.8398 0.8659 0.8102 0.863 0.9282 0.9711 0.9776
Table 3: Cumulative Proportions of (log) Military Burden/Expenditure/GDP ex-
plained by Principal Components
log(burden) log(milex) log(GDP)
N 70
T 1965-2014
PC1 0.548 0.6141 0.9491
PC2 0.7146 0.7782 0.9717
PC3 0.7775 0.849 0.9913
PC4 0.8263 0.8897 0.995
PC5 0.861 0.9206 0.9972
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Figure 1: Principal Components (balanced panel, 1965-2014)
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